Abstract: High quality institutions, such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from government repudiation of contracts, mitigate the adverse economic consequences of ethnic fractionalization identified by Easterly and Levine 1997 and others. In countries with sufficiently good institutions, ethnic diversity does not lower growth or worsen economic policies. High quality institutions also lessen war casualties on national territory and lessen the probability of genocide for a given amount of ethnic fractionalization.
In 88 BC, King Mithriadates VI of Pontus invaded Roman territory in Asia
Minor. He encouraged Asian debtors to kill their Roman creditors. Happy to reduce their credit card bills, the Asians massacred 80,000 Romans.
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Ethnic conflict is a tragic constant of human history. Ethnic conflict is still very much in the news today, from the Balkans to Central Africa to Indonesia to Nigeria.
Recently, the economics literature has studied the effects of ethnic conflict on economic development. Easterly and Levine [1997] document an adverse effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on income, growth, and economic policies. They offer this as an explanation for Africa's poor growth performance. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999a find that more ethnically diverse cities and counties in the US spend less on public goods.
Goldin and Katz 1999 find lower public support for higher education in states with more religious -ethnic heterogeneity. Goldin and Katz 1997 likewise find lower high school graduation rates in states that had higher religious-ethnic diversity. Miguel 1999 likewise finds lower primary school funding in more ethnically diverse districts in Kenya. Mauro 1995 and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998 find that ethnic diversity predicts poor quality of government services. Mauro 1995 and Annett 1999 finds that linguistic or religious diversity leads to greater political instability, which Annett finds in turn leads to higher government consumption. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999b find a link from ethnic diversity to bloated government payrolls in US cities. Rodrik 1999 noted that ethnically polarized nations react more adversely to external terms of trade shocks. Svensson 1998 finds that more foreign aid proceeds are diverted into corruption in more ethnically diverse places. Knack and Keefer 1997 find that ethnic homogeneity raises "social capital" or "trust," which in turn is associated with faster growth and higher output per worker. Alesina and La Ferrara 1999 find that higher ethnic heterogeneity makes participation in social clubs less likely in the US, which is consistent with the idea that there is not much association across groups. Adelman and Morris 1967 also noted that "cultural and ethnic heterogeneity tend to hamper the early stages of nation-building and growth." 2 Easterly and Levine [1997] argue that the adverse effect stems from the political economy "wars of attrition" that take place between ethnic groups (not to mention real wars fought along ethnic lines). To change the metaphor, multiple ethnic groups are subject to "the tragedy of the commons" as each ethnic group over-extracts from a common resource like commodity export rents. Finally, ethnic groups may have difficulty agreeing on the type of public goods, leading to less total spending on public goods --as documented for US cities and counties by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999a. In this paper I ask whether institutional development can mitigate the adverse effects of destructive ethnic group competition.
Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services would plausibly make a given amount of ethnic fractionalization less damaging for development. We can think of an interaction effect between quality of institutions and ethnic diversity that would work something like this:
(Ethnic conflict) = f(Ethnic diversity, Institutional quality)
where f 1 >0, f 2 <0, and ∂ 2 (Ethnic conflict)/(∂Ethnic diversity∂Institutional quality)<0. [1994] ). These studies argue that the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully and quickly, to conduct business where the rules of the game are clear, and to have confidence in the bureaucracy may all influence investment and allocation decisions.
Mauro [1995] and Knack and Keefer [1995] argue that corruption and other institutional factors are correlated with economic growth using data from country risk services for international investors.
I. Growth regression with Institutions
Good institutions may mitigate ethnic conflict. I find that the ethnic effect in the 1970-1979 and 1980-1989. INSTITUTIONS is also highly correlated with corruption. INSTITUTIONS has a correlation of .8 with Mauro's [1995] 1980-1983 index of corruption, which in turn has a correlation of .88 with Knack and Keefer's [1995] 1980-1989 index of corruption.
In Table I POLRIGHTS is the Gastil index of political rights from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most democratic. This variable is insignificant, with the wrong sign and a t-statistic of only .33. These results suggest that it is institutions rather than democracy that contain ethnic conflict, although we should probably take these results with a grain of salt since the two variables are so highly correlated that the result could depend on a few outliers.
II. Institutions, Ethnic Diversity, and Policy Choices Next, I explore the effect of institutions on mitigating the adverse effects of ethnic diversity on policy. While ethnic diversity is given exogenously, countries may be able to adopt institutional arrangements --clear property rights, freedom from expropriation, effective "rules of the game," and an efficient bureaucracy --that mitigate the negative repercussions of diverse interest groups. Clear rules of the game may substantially reduce or eliminate costly rent-seeking behavior associated with ethnic diversity. (2) institutions significantly mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity (Table II) . In fact, the results indicate that in countries with very highly developed institutions, ethnic diversity does not significantly hurt policy choices. Institutional arrangements can overcome the negative implications of ethnic diversity. The coefficient magnitudes imply that the derivative of policies with respect to ETHNIC actually changes sign at very high values of institutions.
Although this suggests a reform strategy that focuses on improving a country's institutions, altering institutional arrangements is fundamentally more difficult than changing, for example, exchange rate policies [see North, 1990] Here I investigate whether the presence of high quality institutions lowers the probability of genocide for a given amount of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Table IV shows the results. Regression [1] shows the basic result: ethnic fragmentation has a significant and positive effect on the probability of genocide, while the interaction term between ethnic fragmentation and INSTITUTIONS has a negative effect. Higher quality institutions make a given degree of ethnic diversity less likely to result in genocide. proxying for democracy, using the well-known Gastil index for suppression of democratic rights. The interaction with democracy is insignificant, while the institutional quality interaction effect remains significant. If we take institutional quality as a measure of economic and legal freedoms, these seems to be more important than political freedoms in mitigating the effect of ethnic diversity on the likelihood of genocide.
The price that this nation must pay for the continued oppression and exploitation of the Negro or any other minority group is the price of its own destruction.
--Martin Luther King Jr.
V. Conclusions
Previous studies Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995) 
